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Abstract
We examine the relation between four dimensions of national culture and
earnings quality of banks using a sample of banks from 39 countries. Our main
analysis, which focuses on the pre-financial crisis period 1993–2006, indicates
that banks in high individualism, high masculinity, and low uncertainty
avoidance societies manage earnings to just-meet-or-beat the prior year’s
earnings. In tests of income smoothing through loan loss provisions, we find
that banks in high individualism, high power distance, and low uncertainty
avoidance societies report smoother earnings. Our exploratory analysis of the
effects of national culture on accounting outcomes during the financial crisis
period 2007–2008 indicates that cultures that encourage higher risk-taking
experienced more bank troubles in the form of larger losses or larger loan loss
provisions.
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INTRODUCTION
We employ four dimensions of national culture identified by
Hofstede (2001) and an international sample of banks to study
the effects of national culture on bank earnings quality. Cross-
country differences in earnings quality are likely to be affected by
differences in bank regulation and monitoring across countries, as
well by softer dimensions such as national culture that may influ-
ence excessive risk-taking. Additionally, differences in national
culture also influence a country’s adoption of accounting systems
and values (Gray, 1988; Radebaugh, Gray, & Black, 2006; Salter &
Niswander, 1995). Such differences became apparent in the recent
financial crisis, which had a considerably larger adverse effect
on banks in certain countries (e.g., the US and the UK) than in
others (e.g., Australia, Canada, and Singapore). In a global survey
on factors that created the conditions for the credit/banking crisis
conducted in May 2008 by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Eco-
nomist Intelligence Unit, 31% of survey participants put the blame
on “monetary policy,” 58% on “ineffective regulatory oversight,”
and an impressive 73% on “culture and excessive risk-taking”
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008). Given these findings, an exami-
nation of the influence of national culture on financial reporting
quality of banks clearly is warranted.
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The extant literature has studied the relation
between national culture and earnings manage-
ment, but has excluded firms in banking and
financial services (e.g., Doupnik, 2008; Han, Kang,
Salter, & Yoo, 2010; Nabar & Thai, 2007). Given the
importance to national and global economies of
this highly leveraged sector of the economy, and
given that firms in this sector are markedly diffe-
rent from industrial firms, it is important to under-
stand the role of cultural factors on earnings quality
of banks. In addition, the influence of cultural
factors may be of greater importance in industries
such as banking, where information uncertainty
is higher relative to industrial firms, because of the
greater complexity of banking operations and
the difficulty of assessing risk on the large and
diverse portfolio of loans (Autore, Billingsley, &
Schneller, 2009). An alternative view is that because
banks operate in a highly regulated environment,
and are monitored by central banks and other regu-
latory agencies (such as deposit insurance corpora-
tions), cultural factors may not be as important in
influencing their earnings management behavior. If
our study establishes a relation between cultural
factors and earnings quality, then cultural differ-
ences across countries are likely to be even more
relevant for firms in other industries that are not
subject to such direct regulatory scrutiny.1
Han et al. (2010) hypothesize and find that
cultural factors influence both income-increasing
and income-decreasing earnings management in
industrial firms. More specifically, they document a
positive relation between the individualism dimen-
sion of national culture and earnings management,
and a negative relation between the uncertainty
avoidance dimension of national culture and earn-
ings management. Given their findings, we examine
the relations between individualism and uncer-
tainty avoidance, and earnings quality of banks.2
Additionally, we explore the relations between the
masculinity and power distance dimensions of
national culture and bank earnings quality.
We focus on the pre-financial crisis period (i.e.,
the period 1993–2006) in our main analysis. We
employ two traditional measures of earnings
management – managing earnings to just-meet-
or-beat the prior year’s earnings benchmark, and an
accrual-based proxy (based on income smoothing
through bank loan loss provision, LLP) – to test the
relation between the individualism, uncertainty
avoidance, masculinity and power distance dimen-
sions of national culture, and earnings quality of
banks. By using two different measures of earnings
management (accruals- and non-accruals-based),
we strengthen the validity and robustness of our
results.
Although our study is primarily exploratory in
nature, we also examine the effects of national
culture on earnings quality of banks during the
financial crisis (i.e., the period 2007–2008). We
examine two related measures of earnings quality
in the crisis period – the probability of a bank
having a large loss, and the probability of a bank
having a large LLP. We choose these two measures
because the probability of a bank having a large
loss is related to the level of earnings and timely
loss recognition, and the probability of a bank
having a large LLP is related to income smoothing
through LLP.
We use an international bank sample from the
BankScope database representing 39 countries
over the period 1993–2008 to test our predictions
on accounting outcomes. For our main analysis,
focusing on the pre-crisis period, we find in both
separate and joint tests that the individualism,
uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity dimen-
sions of national culture are strongly related to
benchmark-beating (just-meeting-or-beating prior
year’s earnings) behavior in banks. More specifi-
cally, individualism and masculinity are positively
related to and uncertainty avoidance is negatively
related to benchmark-beating behavior. In tests
related to income smoothing, we find both sepa-
rately and jointly that individualism and power
distance are positively related to and uncertainty
avoidance is negatively related to income-smooth-
ing behavior of banks. Our results are robust to
several sensitivity tests, including using a reduced
sample that excludes US banks, and using country-
year level data instead of bank-year level data. In
additional analysis, we find that the effect of
national culture on earnings management by banks
is conditional on the level of investor protection,
consistent with the evidence reported in Han et al.
(2010).
Our exploratory analysis on the effects of
national culture on accounting outcomes during
the crisis period provides some interesting insights.
First, we find that banks in high individualism and
high masculinity societies are more likely to incur
a large loss, whereas banks in high uncertainty
avoidance societies are less likely to incur a large
loss. Second, we find that banks in high power
distance societies are more likely to incur a large
LLP, whereas banks in high uncertainty avoidance
societies are less likely to incur a large LLP during
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the crisis period. Third, we find that banks in high
individualism and high power distance societies are
more likely to incur a large loss or a large LLP,
whereas banks in high uncertainty avoidance soci-
eties are less likely to incur a large loss or a large
LLP. These results indicate that national culture has
a first-order effect on bank risk-taking, and on
the probability of a bank getting into trouble, as
evidenced by these two accounting outcomes
during the crisis period.
Our results contribute to the literature in several
ways. First, they extend prior research on the
relation between national culture and earnings
management to the banking industry. Our study
identifies several dimensions of national culture
that are related to earnings quality of banks around
the world. Second, in an international banking
setting, our study can be viewed as identifying
some softer dimensions related to national culture,
in addition to previously identified international
institutional factors and bank-monitoring factors
that influence financial the reporting behavior of
banks. Third, our study records that national cul-
ture played a significant role in risk-taking by banks
and, at a broader level, in the financial crisis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
We discuss related research and develop the hypo-
theses in the next section. This is followed by
a description of the earnings quality measures
and the empirical models used, and the sample
selection and data. We then discuss the results and
provide our conclusions.
RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
To our knowledge, there are only a few studies that
examine the financial reporting quality of banks in
an international setting. Notable exceptions are
Shen and Chih (2005), Fonseca and Gonzalez
(2008), and Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo (2010b),
that examine the relations between international
institutional factors, bank monitoring variables,
auditor reputation, and earnings management. Our
main research question is whether and how
commonly used dimensions of national culture
influence earnings management of banks in an
international setting.
Only recently has the academic literature begun
exploring the influence of national culture as a
potential factor in explaining cross-country varia-
tions in earnings quality (Doupnik, 2008; Han
et al., 2010; Nabar & Thai, 2007). Gray (1988) pro-
poses a model that maps cultural patterns discussed
by Hofstede (1980) to societal values expressed
at the level of accounting subculture. Gray (1988)
indicates that culture is an essential element in
understanding how social systems change, because
culture influences both the norms and values of
such systems and the behavior of groups in their
interactions within and across systems. He states
that the term “culture” is reserved as a whole, for
nations, whereas the term “subculture” is used for
the level of an organization, profession, or family.
While acknowledging that the degree of cultural
integration varies across societies, Gray (1988)
explores the relation between culture and interna-
tional accounting systems at the subculture level.
Given that cultural values permeate a nation’s
social system, he presents theoretical arguments
for the match between national culture and pattern
of accounting systems across countries.3 We draw
heavily on the arguments developed in Gray (1988)
in formulating our hypotheses.
Hofstede and Bond (1988: 6) define culture as
“the collective programming of the mind that dis-
tinguishes the members of one category of people
from those of another. Culture is composed of
certain values, which shape behavior as well as
one’s perception of the world.” In a more recent
study, Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz (2005)
note that value emphases are the essence of culture
when seen as meanings, symbols, and assumptions
about what is good or bad, legitimate or illegi-
timate, that underlie the prevailing practices and
norms in a society. Licht et al. (2005: 234) further
state that
A common postulate in cross-cultural psychology is that all
societies confront similar basic issues or problems when
they come to regulate human activity. The key dimensions
of culture are derived from these issues, because the pre-
ferred ways of dealing with them are expressed in different
societal value emphases. It is thus possible to characterize
the culture of different societies by measuring prevailing
value emphases on these key dimensions. This yields
unique cultural profiles.
In this spirit, we utilize the cultural dimensions
pioneered by Hofstede (2001) for characterizing
national culture.
Since our main analysis focuses on the pre-financial
crisis period, we develop formal hypotheses only
for the relations between cultural dimensions and
pre-crisis earnings management measures (i.e., just-
meeting-or-beating prior year’s earnings, and
income smoothing through LLP). Using Gray’s
framework, Han et al. (2010) posit that where indi-
vidualism is the dominant culture, managers will
have more latitude in terms of self-governance
Culture and earnings quality of banks Kiridaran Kanagaretnam et al
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(professionalism) and flexibility of measurement.4
High individualism cultures emphasize individual
achievements, self-orientation, and autonomy
(Hofstede, 2001). Given that managers are evalu-
ated and rewarded based on reported firm perfor-
mance, they have incentives to meet earnings
performance benchmarks. And, given the greater
emphasis on individual achievements in high indi-
vidualism cultures, managers in such cultures are
more likely to manage earnings to meet or beat
benchmarks. Risk-taking incentives are also likely
to be greater in high individualism societies, where
concern for other stakeholders’ welfare (which is
an indicator of collectivism) is likely to be low.
Higher risk-taking will lead to more volatile earn-
ings, and induce managers to engage in a higher
level of income smoothing (Fonseca & Gonzalez,
2008). Collectively, the above arguments suggest
that the level of earnings management will be
higher in high individualism societies.
However, because banks operate in a highly
regulated environment, in that they are monitored
by central banks and other regulatory agencies
(such as deposit insurance corporations), the over-
all level of earnings management is likely to be
conditional on the level of regulation and bank
monitoring. For example, Fonseca and Gonzalez
(2008) document lower income smoothing in
banks with higher restrictions on bank activities,
and more official and private supervision. Conse-
quently, the individualism dimension of culture
may not be as important in influencing earnings
management in banks relative to industrial firms.
Given this, we present our hypothesis in null form:
Hypothesis 1: Earnings management in banks
is unrelated to the individualism dimension of
national culture.
Gray (1988) suggests that strong uncertainty avoid-
ance leads to a preference for conservative account-
ing. Additionally, Gray’s (1988) model indicates
that countries with high uncertainty avoidance
are more likely to have uniform financial report-
ing standards, with many rules and little room for
professional judgment. These arguments suggest
that higher uncertainty avoidance societies will
have lower earnings management. Consistent with
this reasoning, Doupnik (2008) and Han et al. (2010)
find a negative association between uncertainty
avoidance and earnings management for industrial
firms. Higher uncertainty avoidance is likely to lead
to lower risk-taking, as individuals in such cultures
have a higher level of anxiety, and therefore prefer a
more predictable environment. This, in turn, will
result in more stable earnings and reduced incen-
tives for benchmark beating and income smooth-
ing by banks. However, as discussed earlier, the
influence of cultural factors may not be as pro-
nounced in banking as in other industries because,
unlike firms in other industries, banks are highly
regulated. Accordingly, we present the following
hypothesis stated in null form:
Hypothesis 2: Earnings management in banks is
unrelated to the uncertainty avoidance dimen-
sion of national culture.
Next, we explore the relation between power
distance and earnings management in banks.
Higher power distance implies that decisions are
more centralized, and that managers have greater
influence on financial reporting choices. Recently
enacted regulations, such as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act
in the US, attempt to improve corporate financial
reporting by reducing the power of the CEO
through separation of the roles of CEO and chair-
man of the board of directors, and stipulation that
the board of directors includes a majority of inde-
pendent directors.5 Gray (1988) states that informa-
tion sharing is also low in high power distance
societies. In summary, in high power distance
societies managers can more easily influence finan-
cial reporting choices for opportunistic reasons.
Therefore we predict a positive relation between
the power distance dimension of national culture
and benchmark beating and income smoothing
by banks. Again, because banking is a highly regu-
lated industry, power distance may not be as
important in earnings management. Therefore we
present the following hypothesis in null form:
Hypothesis 3: Earnings management in banks is
unrelated to the power distance dimension of
national culture.
Finally, we explore the relation between the
masculinity dimension of national culture and
earnings management in banks. Masculinity
implies aggressive behavior that includes deci-
siveness and competitiveness. High masculinity
societies are characterized by an emphasis on per-
formance (Hofstede, 2001), suggesting that achi-
eving performance targets and high risk-taking are
more likely in societies with higher masculinity
traits. Therefore we predict a positive relation
Culture and earnings quality of banks Kiridaran Kanagaretnam et al
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between masculinity and benchmark beating and
income smoothing by banks. However, consider-
ing banking is a highly regulated industry, where
earnings management may be constrained, we
present the following hypothesis stated in null
form:
Hypothesis 4: Earnings management in banks
is unrelated to the masculinity dimension of
national culture.
TESTS OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Our main prediction is that national culture
influences earnings management in banks in
the pre-crisis period. We use Hofstede’s (2001) four
main measures as proxies for national culture:
individualism (IND), uncertainty avoidance (UA),
power distance (PD), and masculinity (MAS), which
we assume are constant over the sample period.
Managing Earnings to Just-meet-or-beat the Prior
Year’s Earnings
Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (2002) and Altamuro and
Beatty (2010) report that banks have incentives to
manage earnings to just-meet-or-beat the prior
period’s earnings. We examine how various dimen-
sions of national culture affect this incentive.6
We include all available additional control variables
(size, growth, loans, leverage, change in cash flow,
and loan loss allowance) to be consistent with the
above literature. Prior studies also control for
country-level institutional environment when test-
ing the existence of earnings management across
countries. However, it is well recognized that the
correlations among the country-level institutional
variables are high, so we control for the country
effects in two ways. First, we include country indi-
cator variables in the logistic regression to con-
trol country-level fixed effects. Second, we include
country-level institutional variables to control the
country-wide institutional effect on earnings mana-
gement by banks.7 Specifically, we estimate the
following logistic models:
SMALL POSDt ¼ a0 þ a1INDþ a2UAþ a3PD
þ a4MASþ a5SIZEt þ a6GROWTHt
þ a7LOANSt þ a8LEVt þ a9DCFt
þ a10ALLOWt þ Country Controlsh i
þ Year Controlsh i þ e
ð1aÞ
SMALL POSDt ¼ a0 þ a1INDþ a2UAþ a3PD
þ a4MASþ a5SIZEt þ a6GROWTHt
þ a7LOANSt þ a8LEVt þ a9DCFt
þ a10ALLOWt þ a11BANK
þ a12CR RIGHT þ a13INVPRO
þ a14DISCLþ a15LGDP
þ Year Controlsh i þ e
ð1bÞ
The detailed definitions of the variables are
provided in Table 1. The coefficients of interest
are the coefficients on the four culture variables:
individualism (IND), uncertainty avoidance (UA),
power distance (PD), and masculinity (MAS). If
these dimensions of culture have implications for
earnings quality, then higher values of IND, PD,
and MAS will be associated with higher earnings
management, and the coefficients on these three
variables will be positive.8 In addition, higher
values of UA will lead to lower earnings manage-
ment, and the coefficient on UA will be negative.
On the other hand, if cultural dimensions are not
important, given the highly regulated environment
of the banking industry, then the coefficients on
IND, PD, MAS, and UA will not differ significantly
from zero.
We include the five country-specific variables –
bankmonitoring (BANK), creditor rights (CR_RIGHT),
investor protection (INVPRO), accounting disclosure
(DISCL), and economic development (LGDP) – as
control variables in Eq. (1b), but do not offer direc-
tional predictions on their coefficients. As suggested
by Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008), bank monitoring in
the form of bank regulation and bank supervision
may also affect the extent of earnings management.
We control for creditor rights because Houston, Lin,
Lin, and Mae (2010) record that stronger creditor
rights lead to greater risk-taking (and perhaps more
earnings management to hide that behavior) by
banks. We control for the level of investor protection
and accounting disclosure because the legal environ-
ment (e.g., Han et al., 2010; Leuz, Nanda, &Wysocki,
2003) and financial transparency and disclosure
(Shen & Chih, 2005) can potentially influence the
extent of earnings management in a country.9 Finally,
we control for national economic development
because a higher level of national economic devel-
opment is associated with higher-quality institu-
tions that facilitate private contracting (Claessens &
Laeven, 2003), and hence potentially reduce the
incentives to manage earnings.
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Income Smoothing through Loan Loss Provisions
Prior research (e.g., Fonseca & Gonzalez, 2008;
Kanagaretnam, Lobo, &Mathieu, 2003; Kanagaretnam,
Lobo, & Yang, 2004; Wahlen, 1994) finds that banks
use LLP to smooth income. To smooth income,
banks increase LLP when pre-managed earnings are
high, and decrease LLP when pre-managed earnings
are low. We are interested in determining whether
various dimensions of national culture increase or
decrease the propensity to smooth income. We
estimate income smoothing as the relation between
LLP and EBTP (earnings before taxes and LLP) and
Table 1 Variable definitions
National culture variables
IND ¼ Measure of individualism from Hofstede (2001).
UA ¼ Measure of uncertainty avoidance from Hofstede (2001).
PD ¼ Measure of power distance from Hofstede (2001).
MAS ¼ Measure of masculinity score from Hofstede (2001).
Country-level institutional variables
BANK ¼ Principal component factor derived from the following three variables: regulatory restrictions on
nontraditional bank activities (ENTRY), the official supervisory power index (OFFICIAL), and the private
monitoring index (MONITOR). Regulatory restriction on bank activities is an index that ranges from
0 to 8, with higher values indicating more restrictions on entry into banking. The official supervisory
power index is an index that ranges from 0 to 14; it measures the power of supervisors to take prompt
corrective action, to restructure and reorganize troubled banks, and to declare a troubled bank
insolvent. The private monitoring index ranges from 0 to 7; it measures the extent of monitoring by
outsiders such as international rating agencies. These indices are developed by Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2001).
CR_RIGHT ¼ Index aggregating different creditor rights, as reported in La Porta et al. (1998) and updated in
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). The index ranges from 0 to 4.
INVPRO ¼ Investor protection measure used in Han et al. (2010). This variable is measured as the mean score
across five legal variables: efficiency of the judicial system, assessment of the rule of law, corruption
index, risk of expropriation, and risk of contract repudiation.
DISCL ¼ Disclosure index reported in La Porta et al. (1998).
LGDP ¼ Log of annual gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, based on 2000 constant prices from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
Bank-level variables
SMALL_POSDt ¼ Indicator variable that equals 1 if the bank has a change in ROA (income before taxes divided by total
assets) from the beginning to the end of the year in the interval between 0 and 0.001, 0 otherwise.
SIZEt ¼ Log of total assets at the beginning of the year.
GROWTHt ¼ Growth in total assets from the beginning to the end of the year.
LOANSt ¼ Total loans at the end of the year scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year.
LEVt ¼ Total equity at the end of the year divided by total assets at the beginning of the year.
DCFt ¼ Change in annual cash flows (income before taxes and loan loss provisions) scaled by total assets at the
beginning of the year.
ALLOWt ¼ Allowance for loan losses at the end of the year scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year.
LLP ¼ Provision for loan losses deflated by beginning total assets.
EBTP ¼ Income before taxes and loan loss provisions deflated by beginning total assets.
PASTLLP ¼ Last year’s LLP deflated by total assets at the beginning of the year.
LOANS ¼ Total loans outstanding deflated by beginning total assets.
DLOANS ¼ Change in total loans outstanding deflated by beginning total assets.
BEGLLA ¼ Beginning loan loss allowance deflated by beginning total assets.
LCO ¼ Net loan charge-offs deflated by beginning total assets.
BEGNPL ¼ Beginning balance of nonperforming loans deflated by beginning total assets.
DNPL ¼ Change in nonperforming loans deflated by beginning total assets.
LOAN CATEGORIES ¼ Loans to municipalities/government (MUN), mortgages (MORT), hire-purchase/lease (LEASE), other
loans (OTH), loans to group companies/associates (GRP), loans to other corporations (OCORP) and
loans to banks (BK), each deflated by beginning total assets.
CAPRATIO ¼ Total capital ratio as reported in BankScope.
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the effects of the national culture variables on
income smoothing by including interactions bet-
ween EBTP and measures of the four dimensions of
national culture. Our model explicitly controls for
the normal or nondiscretionary component of LLP
by including the following factors related to normal
LLP that have been identified in prior research:
beginning loan loss allowance, net loan charge-offs,
change in total loans outstanding, total loans out-
standing, loan mix, capital ratio, and last period’s
LLP.10 As before, we control for the country effect in
two ways: by including country indicator variables to
control for country fixed effects, and by including
country-level institutional variables in the regression
model. Following Kanagaretnam et al. (2004), we
use the following models to examine the relation
between proxies for national culture and income
smoothing through LLP:11
LLPit ¼ b0 þ b1EBTP þ b2INDþ b3UAþ b4PD
þ b5MASþ b6IND  EBTP þ b7UA  EBTP
þ b8PD  EBTP þ b9MAS  EBTP
þ b10PASTLLP þ b11LOANSþ b12DLOANS
þ b13BEGLLAþ b14LCOþ b15BEGNPL
þ b16DNPLþ b17tob23 LOANCATEGORIESh i
þ b24CAPRATIOþ Country Controlsh i
þ Year Controlsh i þ e
ð2aÞ
LLPit ¼ b0 þ b1EBTP þ b2INDþ b3UAþ b4PD
þ b5MASþ b6IND  EBTP þ b7UA  EBTP
þ b8PD  EBTP þ b9MAS  EBTP
þ b10PASTLLP þ b11LOANSþ b12DLOANS
þ b13BEGLLAþ b14LCOþ b15BEGNPL
þ b16DNPLþ b17tob23 LOANCATEGORIESh i
þ b24CAPRATIOþ b25BANK þ b26CR RIGHT
þ b27INVPROþ b28DISCLþ b29LGDP
þ Year Controlsh i þ e
ð2bÞ
The detailed definitions of the variables are
provided in Table 1. The coefficients of interest
are the coefficients on EBTP, and its interactions
with the four dimensions of national culture. Con-
sistent with the income-smoothing argument, we
expect a positive coefficient on EBTP. If higher
values of IND, PD, and MAS lead to higher income
smoothing, the coefficients on each of the
three interaction terms IND EBTP, PD EBTP, and
MAS EBTP will be positive. By contrast, if higher
values of UA lead to lower income smoothing, the
coefficient on the interaction term UA EBTP will be
negative. On the other hand, if cultural variables
are not important in a highly regulated industry
such as banking, the coefficients on the four inter-
action variables IND EBTP, PD EBTP, MAS EBTP,
and UA EBTP will not differ significantly from zero.
The models include net loan charge-offs (LCO),
beginning balance of nonperforming loans
(BEGNPL), change in nonperforming loans (DNPL),
and beginning balance of loan loss allowance
(BEGLLA) to account explicitly for the nondiscre-
tionary portion of LLP. Prior studies (e.g.,
Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; Wahlen, 1994) suggest
that LCO, BEGNPL, and DNPL are positively related
to LLP. BEGLLA will be negatively related to LLP,
because a higher initial allowance will require a
smaller provision in the current period, and vice
versa. We use the level of last period’s total LLP
(PASTLLP) to control for the reversal of accruals.
In addition, we include a regulatory capital
variable (CAPRATIO) to control for the potential
effects on LLP of motivations related to capital
management. We include total loans outstanding
(LOANS), change in total loans outstanding
(DLOANS), and loan categories in the model. As
before, we include either country indicators or
country-specific institutional variables in our
regression to control for the country fixed effects
on earnings management by banks.
DATA DESCRIPTION
We obtain financial data for the international banks
for the 1993–2006 (pre-crisis period) and 2007–2008
(crisis period) from the BankScope database.12 We
select sample countries from the 49 countries listed
in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998). We drop ten countries (Ecuador, Egypt,
Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Nigeria, Sri Lanka,
Sweden, and Zimbabwe), because of missing bank-
specific information (such as loan charge-offs, loan
loss provisions, loan loss allowance, and capital
ratio).13 We retain the remaining 39 countries in
our study. These include Argentina, Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain,
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, US,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.
We present the sample distribution by year and
by country in Panels A and B, respectively, of
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Table 2. There are 21,444 and 12,745 bank-years for
the just-meet-or-beat test and income-smoothing
test, respectively.14 The sample for the just-meet-or-
beat test is larger than the sample for the income-
smoothing test because of the less stringent data
requirements for the former test. The number of
bank-years reported in Panel A grows over time
because of the increasing coverage of banks in
BankScope.15
In Panel B, there is significant variation in the
number of bank-year observations across countries
due to differences in capital market development,
country size, and availability of complete financial
accounting data. Since US banks represent a
significant proportion of the total sample (around
49% and 73% for our two earnings management
tests), we also conduct sensitivity checks to ensure
that our results are robust to excluding US banks
from the analyses.
Table 3 reports measures of the country-level
culture and other institutional variables. Western
societies such as the US, Australia, the UK, Canada,
and the Netherlands exhibit a higher level of
individualism (IND), whereas some Asian societies
(e.g., South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore) exhibit a
higher level of collectivism. Japan and Portugal
have the highest index for uncertainty avoidance
(UA), and Singapore the lowest. The Philippines
and Mexico have the highest power distance (PD),
whereas Austria and Israel have the lowest. Lastly,
Japan has the highest score for masculinity (MAS),
and Norway the lowest.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The residuals from the regression models may be
serially and/or cross-sectionally correlated. We there-
fore use OLS/logistic regressions with clustered
robust errors to account for both serial and cross-
sectional correlations (Petersen, 2009). For all tests,
we report Wald or t statistics based on clustered
standard errors after correcting for both serial and
cross-sectional correlations in the residuals.
Meet-or-beat Prior Year’s Earnings Test
We report descriptive statistics (mean values) of
bank-level variables for the just-meet-or-beat test
across countries in Table 4. On average, 11.29% of
our sample banks report a small increase in earn-
ings over the prior year. The mean values of other
variables used in the regression are also reported in
Table 4.
We report the results for the logistic regressions in
Table 5. For the main variables of interest (i.e.,
Table 2 Sample distribution
Year Meet-or-beat Income smoothing
N % N %
Panel A: Distribution by year
1993 111 0.52 9 0.07
1994 406 1.89 247 1.94
1995 518 2.42 297 2.33
1996 635 2.96 341 2.68
1997 722 3.37 438 3.44
1998 812 3.79 501 3.93
1999 956 4.46 608 4.77
2000 2435 11.36 1422 11.16
2001 2495 11.63 1597 12.53
2002 2485 11.59 1629 12.78
2003 2558 11.93 1632 12.81
2004 2476 11.55 1376 10.80
2005 2504 11.68 1318 10.34
2006 2331 10.87 1330 10.44
21,444 100.00 12,745 100.00
Panel B: Distribution by country
Argentina 262 1.22 2 0.02
Australia 335 1.56 90 0.71
Austria 45 0.21 8 0.06
Belgium 12 0.06 3 0.02
Brazil 637 2.97 417 3.27
Canada 69 0.32 54 0.42
Chile 163 0.76 15 0.12
Colombia 154 0.72 18 0.14
Denmark 11 0.05 – 0.00
France 338 1.58 11 0.09
Germany 72 0.34 31 0.24
Greece 108 0.50 – 0.00
Hong Kong 435 2.03 307 2.41
India 208 0.97 59 0.46
Ireland 153 0.71 27 0.21
Israel 113 0.53 70 0.55
Italy 179 0.83 4 0.03
Japan 3213 14.98 824 6.47
South Korea 221 1.03 55 0.43
Malaysia 158 0.74 – 0.00
Mexico 150 0.70 48 0.38
Netherlands 62 0.29 15 0.12
New Zealand 68 0.32 40 0.31
Norway 383 1.79 154 1.21
Pakistan 102 0.48 13 0.10
Peru 24 0.11 6 0.05
Philippines 111 0.52 81 0.64
Portugal 276 1.29 87 0.68
Singapore 55 0.26 8 0.06
South Africa 216 1.01 87 0.68
Spain 484 2.26 294 2.31
Switzerland 17 0.08 1 0.01
Taiwan 352 1.64 221 1.73
Thailand 114 0.53 83 0.65
Turkey 209 0.97 42 0.33
United Kingdom 1215 5.67 115 0.90
Uruguay 32 0.15 – 0.00
USA 10,577 49.32 9330 73.21
Venezuela 111 0.52 125 0.98
21,444 100.00 12,745 100.00
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cultural dimensions), we report the regression
coefficient, followed by the Wald statistic in
parentheses, and the marginal effect (in percent)
in square brackets. The marginal effect indicates
the change in the probability of meeting the
benchmark per standard deviation change in each
respective culture variable (holding other indepen-
dent variables constant).16 Models (1)–(4) present
the results for the effects of individual culture
variables on the propensity to just-meet-or-beat
prior year’s earnings, after controlling for bank
characteristics, and country and year fixed effects.
A positive coefficient on IND, PD, and MAS
indicates that banks are more likely to manage
earnings to just-meet-or-beat prior year’s earnings
when the individualism, power distance and mas-
culinity dimensions of national culture are higher.
A negative coefficient on UA indicates that banks
are less likely to manage earnings to just-meet-
or-beat prior year’s earnings when the uncer-
tainty avoidance dimension of national culture is
higher.
We find that banks in high individualism
and high masculinity societies are more likely to
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of culture and institutional variables
Country IND UA PD MAS ENTRY OFFICAL MONITOR BANK INVPRO CR_RIGHT DISCL Mean GDP
Argentina 46 86 49 56 6 12 5 0.37 5.64 1 71 7643
Australia 90 51 36 61 8 12 6 0.73 9.30 1 100 20,441
Austria 55 70 11 79 8 14 2 2.14 9.47 3 70 24,394
Belgium 75 94 65 54 8 13 4 0.70 9.49 2 93 23,486
Brazil 38 76 69 49 8 15 4 1.14 6.46 1 57 3456
Canada 80 48 39 52 8 7 5 1.21 9.58 1 100 23,943
Chile 23 86 63 28 3 11 3 0.26 6.77 2 93 5174
Colombia 13 80 67 64 8 13 3 1.31 5.66 0 14 2187
Denmark 74 23 18 16 8 9 3 0.45 9.80 3 87 32,028
France 71 86 68 43 6 8 4 0.63 8.97 0 100 22,968
Germany 67 65 35 66 4 11 4 0.23 9.37 3 100 23,723
Greece 35 112 60 57 8 10 4 0.05 6.84 1 45 10,692
Hong Kong 25 29 68 57 6 11 5 0.59 8.77 4 80 24,722
India 48 40 77 56 6 9 3 0.20 6.12 4 79 544
Ireland 70 35 28 68 7 11 4 0.15 8.74 1 100 25,744
Israel 54 81 13 47 6 8 5 1.24 7.79 4 100 19,263
Italy 76 75 50 70 8 6 4 0.81 7.95 2 100 19,312
Japan 46 92 54 95 6 13 4 0.46 9.14 2 100 38,536
South Korea 18 85 60 39 7 10 5 0.68 6.71 3 65 10,959
Malaysia 26 36 104 50 7 11 5 0.46 7.71 4 100 4264
Mexico 30 82 81 69 8 10 2 1.27 5.99 0 68 5735
Netherlands 80 53 38 14 8 8 4 0.38 9.87 2 100 23,142
New Zealand 79 49 22 58 6 9 6 1.63 9.80 3 100 14,121
Norway 69 50 31 8 8 9 5 0.77 9.92 2 76 38,493
Pakistan 14 70 55 50 7 14 4 0.80 4.30 4 68 533
Peru 16 87 64 42 8 14 3 1.53 4.83 0 54 2141
Philippines 32 44 94 64 7 12 4 0.36 4.08 0 80 938
Portugal 27 104 63 31 7 13 4 0.58 7.81 1 81 9920
Singapore 20 8 74 48 7 3 5 2.20 8.99 4 100 22,210
South Africa 65 49 49 63 8 4 5 1.86 6.70 3 88 3111
Spain 51 86 57 42 8 10 4 0.05 7.87 2 93 14,785
Switzerland 68 58 34 70 8 13 4 0.70 9.99 1 100 34,259
Taiwan 17 69 58 45 8 9 5 0.77 8.08 2 60 14,474
Thailand 20 64 64 34 8 11 4 0.27 5.93 3 51 2101
Turkey 37 85 66 45 7 11 4 0.15 5.46 2 59 3044
United Kingdom 89 35 35 66 8 12 5 0.12 9.40 4 100 24,611
Uruguay 36 100 61 38 7 13 5 0.03 6.07 2 33 5951
USA 91 46 40 62 7 14 4 0.78 9.52 1 87 33,618
Venezuela 12 76 81 73 8 14 2 2.14 6.15 3 36 5019
Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1.
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just-meet-or-beat prior year’s earnings, whereas
banks in high uncertainty avoidance societies are
less likely to just-meet-or-beat prior year’s earnings.
We do not find evidence that banks in high power
distance societies are more likely to report a small
earnings increase over the prior year. The marginal
effect of the cultural factors indicates that the
economic significance of culture is nontrivial. For
example, in model (2), a one standard deviation
increase in UA reduces a bank’s propensity to just-
meet-or-beat the earnings benchmark by 11.93%.
Overall, the evidence exhibits that national culture
plays an important role in influencing earnings
management by banks to just-meet-or-beat prior
year’s earnings.
With regard to bank-level controls, we find that
larger banks and banks with higher loans are more
likely to just-meet-or-beat prior year’s earnings. On
the other hand, high-growth, high-leverage and
high-cash flow banks, and banks with high loan
loss allowance, are less likely to manage earnings to
just-meet-or-beat prior year’s earnings.
Table 4 Descriptive statistics (mean values) of variables used in the just-meet-or-beat test
Country No. of banks Bank-years SMALL_POS SIZE GROWTH LOANS LEV DCF ALLOW
Argentina 94 262 0.011 5.652 0.136 0.422 0.245 0.022 0.012
Australia 98 335 0.104 8.022 0.147 0.832 0.078 0.002 0.007
Austria 15 45 0.289 10.352 0.154 0.557 0.052 0.002 0.014
Belgium 7 12 0.250 12.662 0.117 0.491 0.032 0.002 0.005
Brazil 185 637 0.031 6.824 0.215 0.404 0.178 0.007 0.011
Canada 18 69 0.159 10.257 0.099 0.612 0.055 0.001 0.006
Chile 32 163 0.043 7.217 0.142 0.637 0.142 0.003 0.012
Colombia 46 154 0.032 6.087 0.171 0.636 0.183 0.003 0.014
Denmark 7 11 0.000 9.229 0.190 0.660 0.075 0.002 0.011
France 158 338 0.222 9.374 0.069 0.505 0.082 0.001 0.011
Germany 24 72 0.194 11.216 0.082 0.359 0.067 0.010 0.007
Greece 35 108 0.074 8.148 0.282 0.589 0.093 0.007 0.013
Hong Kong 127 435 0.046 6.958 0.049 0.515 0.191 0.001 0.010
India 68 208 0.024 7.937 0.177 0.556 0.085 0.004 0.014
Ireland 43 153 0.131 8.947 0.250 0.642 0.086 0.002 0.007
Israel 22 113 0.097 8.232 0.055 0.714 0.076 0.001 0.004
Italy 152 179 0.145 8.400 0.135 0.707 0.093 0.004 0.013
Japan 710 3,213 0.156 7.852 0.021 0.567 0.057 0.000 0.012
South Korea 61 221 0.072 9.326 0.203 0.684 0.074 0.002 0.013
Malaysia 55 158 0.057 7.186 0.157 0.511 0.156 0.002 0.016
Mexico 54 150 0.047 6.909 0.263 0.630 0.150 0.003 0.012
Netherlands 29 62 0.177 10.185 0.139 0.548 0.062 0.002 0.005
New Zealand 14 68 0.074 8.186 0.173 0.931 0.061 0.003 0.006
Norway 99 383 0.112 7.219 0.138 0.973 0.085 0.001 0.011
Pakistan 29 102 0.069 6.031 0.233 0.580 0.087 0.012 0.012
Peru 12 24 0.000 5.461 0.218 0.612 0.186 0.015 0.016
Philippines 47 111 0.090 6.263 0.196 0.628 0.178 0.005 0.015
Portugal 77 276 0.145 8.385 0.151 0.555 0.084 0.002 0.010
Singapore 26 55 0.073 7.315 0.008 0.593 0.180 0.001 0.011
South Africa 78 216 0.042 7.402 0.260 0.728 0.127 0.008 0.012
Spain 137 484 0.240 8.840 0.129 0.716 0.076 0.002 0.015
Switzerland 6 17 0.118 12.180 0.145 0.188 0.062 0.000 0.003
Taiwan 65 352 0.108 9.292 0.106 0.702 0.095 0.001 0.009
Thailand 45 114 0.044 7.367 0.227 0.810 0.180 0.009 0.013
Turkey 87 209 0.014 7.393 0.623 0.671 0.140 0.021 0.012
United Kingdom 305 1215 0.170 8.051 0.107 0.608 0.101 0.001 0.006
Uruguay 20 32 0.000 5.073 0.104 0.593 0.226 0.018 0.012
USA 1834 10,577 0.105 7.750 0.123 0.716 0.098 0.002 0.009
Venezuela 48 111 0.009 6.005 0.763 0.545 0.205 0.020 0.015
All countries 4969 21,444 0.113 7.801 0.124 0.660 0.100 0.003 0.010
The table provides descriptive statistics (mean values) for variables in the just-meet-or-beat test at the country level. Definitions of the variables are
provided in Table 1.
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In model (5), we include all four cultural factors
as well as bank-level control variables and country
and year controls. The coefficients on IND and MAS
are positive and significant at the 1% level and 5%
level, respectively, and the coefficient on UA is
negative and significant at the 5% level. Our results
Table 5 Regression results for the just-meet-or-beat test
Variable Coeff. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept a0 3.334 1.640 2.011 21.226 30.281 7.375
(39.88)*** (3.46)* (0.13) (14.92)*** (9.45)*** (84.11)***
IND a1 0.028 0.081 0.008
(13.26)*** (12.80)*** (5.23)**
[7.26%] [20.99%] [2.07%]
UA a2 0.070 0.227 0.011
(13.54)*** (5.83)** (26.77)***
[11.93%] [38.70%] [1.88%]
PD a3 0.071 0.136 0.012
(0.79) (2.31) (9.57)***
[9.34%] [17.88%] [1.58%]
MAS a4 0.231 0.263 0.011
(12.87)*** (5.84)** (15.71)***
[48.5%] [55.62%] [2.33%]
SIZE a5 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.072
(27.74)*** (27.70)*** (27.73)*** (27.73)*** (27.73)*** (41.22)***
GROWTH a6 0.820 0.814 0.811 0.812 0.811 0.817
(24.71)*** (24.30)*** (24.11)*** (24.17)*** (24.11)*** (26.88)***
LOANS a7 0.537 0.534 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.539
(20.79)*** (20.55)*** (20.41)*** (20.45)*** (20.41)*** (22.19)***
LEV a8 4.349 4.351 4.355 4.354 4.355 4.643
(56.46)*** (56.51)*** (56.55)*** (56.56)*** (56.55)*** (62.51)***
DCF a9 8.757 8.738 8.725 8.727 8.725 8.058
(55.45)*** (55.36)*** (55.07)*** (55.32)*** (55.07)*** (58.73)***
ALLOW a10 43.348 43.293 43.276 43.287 43.276 41.420
(89.24)*** (89.01)*** (88.91)*** (88.96)*** (88.91)*** (85.27)***
BANK a11 0.177
(8.59)***
CR_RIGHT a12 0.157
(12.32)***
INVPRO a13 0.044
(0.26)
DISCL a14 0.019
(16.58)***
LGDP a15 0.252
(5.92)**
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 7.79% 7.79% 7.80% 7.79% 7.80% 6.66%
N 21,444 21,444 21,444 21,444 21,444 21,444
Likelihood ratio 861.74*** 862.53*** 862.65*** 862.64*** 862.65*** 734.43***
The regression model is given as Eq. (1a) or (1b). Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. Models (1)–(4) present the results for the effects of
individual culture variables on the propensity to just-meet-or-beat prior year’s earnings, after controlling for bank characteristics, fixed country and year
effects. In model (5), all four cultural factors as well as bank-level control variables and country and year controls are included. In model (6), the country
controls are replaced with country-level institutional variables.
For each variable we report the regression coefficient, followed by the Wald statistic in parentheses. For the main variable of interest (culture variable),
we also report the marginal effect (in percent) in the square brackets. The marginal effect indicates the change in the probability of meeting benchmark
per standard deviation change in each respective cultural variable (holding other independent variables constant). The marginal effect per standard
deviation (SD) change for a cultural variable is computed as p (1p) b SD, where p is the base rate (0.11) and b is the estimated coefficient from
the logistic regression (Liao, 1994).
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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suggest that, although the banking industry is
highly regulated, national culture has an impor-
tant, first-order effect on a bank’s earnings manage-
ment behavior.
In model (6), we replace the country controls
with country-level institutional variables. All the
culture variables (including PD) are significant and
have the expected signs. The results for the bank-
level controls are similar to those reported in model
(5). For the country-level institutional variables, we
find that banks are more likely to manage earnings
when creditor rights and economic wealth are
higher, and less likely to manage earnings when
bank monitoring and accounting disclosure are
higher.
Overall, the results presented in Table 5 provide
support for the prediction that national culture
affects earnings management by banks to just-
meet-or-beat prior year’s earnings, despite banking
being a highly regulated industry.
Income-smoothing Test
We present descriptive statistics (mean values) of
bank-level variables for the income-smoothing test
across countries in Table 6. Across all sample
countries, the mean LLP is 0.41% and the mean
EBTP is 2.14%. The descriptive statistics for other
variables used in the regression are also reported in
Table 6.
Table 6 Descriptive statistics (mean values) for selected variables in the income-smoothing test
Country No. of
banks
Bank-years LLP EBTP BEGLLP LOANS DLOANS BEGLLA LCO BEGNPL DNPL CAPRATIO
Argentina 2 2 0.038 0.136 0.033 0.603 0.025 0.040 0.006 0.070 0.036 6.600
Australia 20 90 0.002 0.016 0.002 0.850 0.123 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.011 11.922
Austria 5 8 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.337 0.020 0.011 0.003 0.011 0.119 16.800
Belgium 2 3 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.478 0.052 0.006 0.001 0.011 0.000 10.933
Brazil 123 417 0.017 0.057 0.013 0.508 0.093 0.026 0.021 0.038 0.005 23.015
Canada 12 54 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.590 0.052 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.000 12.048
Chile 6 15 0.010 0.028 0.007 0.798 0.124 0.014 0.007 0.009 0.001 12.237
Colombia 7 18 0.014 0.023 0.020 0.625 0.068 0.031 0.006 0.024 0.001 13.033
France 10 11 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.516 0.053 0.008 0.002 0.014 0.000 11.627
Germany 8 31 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.417 0.019 0.011 0.003 0.017 0.002 11.926
Hong Kong 73 307 0.009 0.025 0.010 0.607 0.013 0.022 0.009 0.028 0.019 30.297
India 26 59 0.008 0.020 0.009 0.582 0.121 0.024 0.009 0.045 0.003 13.269
Ireland 8 27 0.002 0.018 0.002 0.780 0.140 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.000 11.859
Israel 16 70 0.005 0.013 0.004 0.707 0.038 0.004 0.002 0.054 0.012 13.230
Italy 4 4 0.005 0.019 0.004 0.758 0.091 0.026 0.006 0.044 0.002 10.650
Japan 167 824 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.670 0.001 0.018 0.005 0.051 0.002 9.254
South Korea 15 55 0.008 0.018 0.009 0.690 0.092 0.014 0.008 0.014 0.003 12.004
Mexico 18 48 0.008 0.027 0.007 0.669 0.051 0.034 0.006 0.021 0.001 16.056
Netherlands 8 15 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.622 0.062 0.006 0.001 0.009 0.000 10.993
New Zealand 10 40 0.001 0.018 0.001 0.897 0.135 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.024 11.573
Norway 36 154 0.003 0.015 0.003 0.934 0.098 0.014 0.001 0.015 0.001 12.671
Pakistan 8 13 0.005 0.034 0.003 0.652 0.145 0.033 0.003 0.053 0.004 14.462
Peru 2 6 0.007 0.025 0.005 0.565 0.021 0.073 0.028 0.050 0.008 12.100
Philippines 36 81 0.012 0.022 0.012 0.566 0.075 0.041 0.006 0.080 0.023 18.311
Portugal 26 87 0.005 0.015 0.004 0.590 0.087 0.013 0.004 0.017 0.001 11.095
Singapore 5 8 0.031 0.022 0.013 0.694 0.048 0.035 0.005 0.069 0.058 20.575
South Africa 31 87 0.011 0.033 0.008 0.785 0.121 0.027 0.010 0.033 0.027 17.006
Spain 75 294 0.003 0.017 0.003 0.729 0.106 0.013 0.001 0.009 0.000 12.554
Switzerland 1 1 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.149 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 18.000
Taiwan 52 221 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.689 0.048 0.009 0.015 0.034 0.005 18.611
Thailand 21 83 0.010 0.017 0.008 0.693 0.075 0.048 0.007 0.086 0.004 15.048
Turkey 17 42 0.008 0.040 0.007 0.575 0.159 0.022 0.000 0.033 0.001 18.448
United Kingdom 38 115 0.004 0.015 0.003 0.587 0.077 0.013 0.003 0.017 0.024 14.235
USA 1632 9330 0.003 0.021 0.002 0.715 0.083 0.008 0.002 0.005 0.000 15.360
Venezuela 48 125 0.022 0.083 0.017 0.581 0.131 0.035 0.012 0.029 0.005 28.829
All countries 2568 12,745 0.004 0.021 0.004 0.700 0.077 0.011 0.004 0.013 0.001 15.549
The table provides descriptive statistics (mean values) for variables used in the income-smoothing test at the country level. Definitions of the variables
are provided in Table 1.
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We report the regression results for the income-
smoothing test in Table 7. Similar to the just-meet-
or-beat prior year’s earnings test, we report the
marginal effect (in square brackets) for the main
variables of interest (the interactions between the
dimensions of national culture and EBTP). The
marginal effect indicates the change in LLP for a
one standard deviation change in the interaction
term between each culture variable and EBTP.
The first four models report the results for the
individual culture variables and their interactions
with EBTP, after controlling for bank characteris-
tics, fixed country and year effects. Consistent with
our expectation, EBTP is positively and significantly
associated with LLP in all the models, indicating
prevalence of income smoothing in our sample of
banks. The variable of interest is the interaction
between each dimension of national culture and
Table 7 Regression results for the income-smoothing test
Variable Coeff. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept b0 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.026 0.003 0.002
(1.43) (0.01) (1.73)* (2.29)** (1.95)* (0.64)
EBTP b1 0.118 0.138 0.082 0.114 0.058 0.069
(4.69)*** (4.85)*** (4.52)*** (4.63)*** (2.10)** (2.52)***
IND b2 0.011 0.025 0.000
(1.59) (1.32) (0.02)
UA b3 0.009 0.086 0.009
(0.48) (1.33) (3.45)***
PD b4 0.037 0.185 0.011
(1.91)* (1.85)* (2.51)***
MAS b5 0.138 0.131 0.005
(2.38)** (1.91)* (2.04)**
IND*EBTP b6 0.002 0.004 0.003
(4.41)*** (2.92)*** (2.02)**
[0.17%] [0.35%] [0.26%]
UA * EBTP b7 0.008 0.008 0.005
(3.77)*** (3.76)*** (3.38)***
[0.24%] [0.24%] [0.15%]
PD * EBTP b8 0.005 0.011 0.009
(4.78)*** (4.29)*** (3.36)***
[0.24%] [0.53%] [0.43%]
MAS * EBTP b9 0.004 0.001 0.001
(3.51)*** (0.63) (0.12)
[0.19%] [0.05%] [0.05%]
PASTLLP a10 0.313 0.307 0.314 0.320 0.307 0.319
(5.49)*** (5.47)*** (5.61)*** (5.67)*** (5.69)*** (5.75)***
LOANS a11 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001
(4.36)*** (3.60)*** (4.54)*** (4.94)*** (4.25)*** (3.62)***
DLOANS a12 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
(1.45) (1.46) (1.53) (1.63) (1.73)* (0.62)
BEGLLA a13 0.177 0.170 0.173 0.171 0.160 0.144
(4.77)*** (4.58)*** (4.70)*** (4.60)*** (4.39)*** (4.07)***
LCO a14 0.445 0.436 0.438 0.446 0.412 0.405
(7.54)*** (7.41)*** (7.47)*** (7.57)*** (7.23)*** (7.06)***
BEGNPL a15 0.067 0.066 0.066 0.062 0.065 0.056
(3.43)*** (3.36)*** (3.41)*** (3.16)*** (3.39)*** (3.28)***
DNPL a16 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.028
(4.07)*** (4.11)*** (4.08)*** (4.10)*** (4.14)*** (3.98)***
MUN a17 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
(3.67)*** (1.83)* (3.81)*** (2.18)** (1.95)** (0.19)
MORT a18 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(3.05)*** (2.44)** (3.22)*** (3.29)*** (2.95)*** (1.72)*
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EBTP. If national culture has an important effect on
a bank’s income-smoothing behavior, then the
coefficients on the interaction terms IND EBTP,
PD EBTP, andMAS EBTP are expected to be positive,
and the coefficient on the interaction term UA EBTP
is expected to be negative.
Our results indicate that all four dimensions of
national culture have a significant impact on
income smoothing by banks. Specifically, in models
(1), (3), and (4), the coefficients on IND EBTP,
PD EBTP, and MAS EBTP are positive and signi-
ficant at the 1% level. In model (2), the coefficient
for UA EBTP is negative and significant at the 1%
level. In terms of economic significance, the effect
of culture on the income-smoothing behavior of
banks is nontrivial. For example, a one standard
deviation increase in UA EBTP reduces total LLP
by 0.24%.
For the bank-level control variables, consistent
with our expectation, PASTLLP, LCO, BEGNPL, and
DNPL are all positively and significantly associated
with LLP, whereas BEGLLA and CAPRATIO are
negatively and significantly associated with LLP.
In model (5), we include all four cultural fac-
tors along with the bank-level control variables
and country and year controls in the regression.
We obtain similar results, with the exception
of MAS EBTP, which is no longer significant. In
model (6), we replace the country controls with the
country-level institutional variables. The coeffi-
cients on the interactions between the culture
variables and EBTP are similar to those reported in
model (5). The coefficient estimates for the bank-
level controls are also similar to those reported in
model (5). For the country-level institutional vari-
ables, the coefficients for CR_RIGHT and LGDP are
Table 7 Continued
Variable Coeff. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
LEASE a19 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006
(1.16) (1.46) (1.27) (1.28) (1.74)* (1.75)*
OTH a20 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
(4.57)*** (3.26)*** (4.98)*** (3.59)*** (5.28)*** (5.93)***
GRP a21 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.029
(1.59) (1.57) (1.58) (1.48) (1.58) (1.36)
OCORP a22 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(3.64)*** (2.64)*** (3.91)*** (2.75)*** (3.69)*** (3.14)***
BK a23 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.64) (0.40) (0.64) (0.39) (0.65) (1.44)
CAPRATIO a24 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
(2.72)*** (2.72)*** (2.61)*** (2.63)*** (2.17)** (3.23)***
BANK a25 0.001
(1.46)
CR_RIGHT a26 0.001
(2.32)**
INVPRO a27 0.002
(5.00)***
DISCL a28 0.001
(1.98)**
LGDP a29 0.002
(3.90)***
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12,745 12,745 12,745 12,745 12,745 12,745
Adj. R2 61.42% 61.69% 61.85% 61.30% 63.20% 62.17%
The regression model is given as Eq. (2a) or (2b). Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. The first four models report the results for the
individual culture variables and their interactions with EBTP, after controlling for bank characteristics, fixed country and year effects. In model (5), all four
cultural factors along with the bank-level control variables and country and year controls are included in the regression. In model (6), the country
controls are replaced by the country-level institutional variables.
For ease of presentation, the coefficient for IND, UA, PD, MAS, and CAPRATIO have all been multiplied by 102. For the main variable of interest (the
interaction term between culture variables and EBTP), we also report the marginal effect (in percent) in the square brackets. The marginal effect indicates
the change in the LLP with one standard deviation change in the interaction term between the culture variables and EBTP.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed, respectively.
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positive and significant, whereas the coefficients
for INVPRO and DISCL are negative and significant.
Overall, we find consistent evidence that banks
in high individualism, high power distance, and
low uncertainty avoidance societies tend to smooth
earnings to a greater extent than banks in low
individualism, low power distance, and high uncer-
tainty avoidance societies. These results indicate
that cultural factors have an important effect on
income-smoothing behavior, despite the high level
of regulation in the banking industry.
Crisis Period Analysis
In this section, we provide preliminary evidence on
whether cultural factors help explain the lower
earnings quality experienced by banks during the
recent financial crisis. Banks that focus on beating
earnings thresholds tend to recognize losses in a
less timely fashion, and banks with less timely loss
reporting tend to report lower future profitability.17
Hence we examine two related measures of earn-
ings quality – the probability of a bank having a
large loss and the probability of a bank having a
large LLP (related to income smoothing through
LLP) – during the crisis period. A bank is considered
to incur a large loss when its return on assets (ROA,
income before taxes divided by total assets) is less
than 5%, and to have a large LLP when its LLP
exceeds 1% of total loans. These benchmarks are
reasonable, since the mean (median) values of ROA
and LLP/Loans (LLP divided by total loans) during
the pre-crisis period for our sample banks are 1.25%
(0.89%) and 0.15% (0.19%), respectively.
We use the same models as in Eqs. (1a) and (1b),
except that the dependent variables are now rede-
fined as large loss, large LLP, and either large loss or
large LLP. Our test specification closely follows Lel
and Miller (2008), Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2009),
and Beltratti and Stulz (2010). The independent
variables are measured in 2006, that is, prior to
the financial crisis. The dependent variables (i.e.,
ROAo5% and/or LLP/Loans41%) are from either
2007 or 2008. To ensure that these banks were not
troubled prior to 2007, we delete banks with
ROAo5% and/or LLP/Loans41% in 2006. Thus
our tests relate to banks that were healthy in 2006
but had a large loss or a large LLP in 2007 or 2008.
The results for the crisis period analysis are
reported in Table 8. We report results for large loss,
large LLP, and either large loss or large LLP tests
in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. We find that
banks in high individualism and high masculinity
societies are more likely to incur a large loss, whereas
banks in high uncertainty avoidance societies are less
likely to incur a large loss during the crisis period.
These results are consistent with the notion that
societies that encourage higher risk-taking experi-
encedmore bank troubles. We also find that banks in
high power distance societies are more likely to incur
a large LLP, whereas banks in high uncertainty
avoidance societies are less likely to incur a large
LLP during the crisis period. Lastly, banks in high
individualism and high power distance societies are
more likely to incur either a large loss or a large
LLP, whereas banks in high uncertainty avoidance
societies are less likely to incur either a large loss or
a large LLP during the crisis period. Overall, we
provide some early evidence that cultural factors
help explain financial difficulties faced by banks
during the crisis period.
Sensitivity Checks
We conduct several additional tests to assess the
robustness of our findings. All our sensitivity checks
discussed in this section are based primarily on Eqs.
(1a) and (2a).18 First, we exclude US banks from the
analysis, since they represent a significant fraction of
our sample. Our results are robust, and inferences
remained unchanged, with the exclusion of these US
banks.
Second, we conduct our analysis for the full sample
period that includes the crisis years. We include an
indicator variable for the crisis as additional control
in Eqs. (1a) and (2a). The untabulated results indicate
that our main inferences hold with this alternative
model specification.
Third, prior studies also use loss avoidance as
an alternative earnings benchmark (Burgstahler &
Dichev, 1997). We test the robustness of our results
to using the loss-avoidance benchmark by replacing
SMALL_POS in Eq. (1a) with LOSS_AVOID, an indi-
cator variable that equals 1 if the bank has ROA
(income before taxes scaled by total assets) in the
interval between 0 and 0.001, and 0 otherwise.
Untabulated results indicate that only the coeffi-
cient on MAS is positively and significantly asso-
ciated with LOSS_AVOID. Following Leuz et al.
(2003), we also focus on the subset of firms that
report small profits (i.e., with ROA between 0 and
0.01) and small losses (i.e., with ROA between 0 and
0.01). Our untabulated results indicate that IND
and PD are positively and significantly (1% and
10%, respectively) associated with loss-avoidance
for these firms.
Fourth, we assess whether the effect of national cul-
ture on a bank’s earnings management is conditional
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Table 8 Crisis period analysis
Variable Coeff. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Panel A: Large loss test
Intercept a0 2.671 1.645 7.881 16.390 18.767 0.369
(12.03)*** (1.62) (3.67)* (7.41)*** (12.05)*** (0.08)
IND a1 0.026 0.012 0.013
(5.23)** (9.49)*** (5.57)**
[12.33%] [5.69%] [6.17%]
UA a2 0.058 0.051 0.023
(6.28)*** (10.32)*** (12.38)***
[20.65%] [18.19%] [8.19%]
PD a3 0.013 0.007 0.002
(1.70) (2.34) (0.21)
[3.56%] [1.92%] [0.55%]
MAS a4 0.018 0.059 0.014
(6.31)*** (11.04)*** (8.32)***
[7.14%] [23.39%] [5.55%]
SIZE a5 0.081 0.082 0.083 0.082 0.083 0.088
(12.22)*** (12.54)*** (12.72)*** (12.65)*** (12.76)*** (16.79)***
GROWTH a6 0.121 0.118 0.111 0.117 0.115 0.051
(0.96) (0.92) (0.83) (0.91) (0.88) (0.28)
LOANS a7 0.149 0.145 0.135 0.144 0.140 0.042
(0.64) (0.61) (0.54) (0.60) (0.57) (0.08)
LEV a8 1.700 1.701 1.628 1.698 1.687 1.739
(11.31)*** (11.32)*** (10.30)*** (11.28)*** (11.03)*** (11.94)***
DCF a9 0.407 0.381 0.287 0.370 0.341 0.600
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09)
ALLOW a10 4.022 3.994 3.848 3.981 3.942 4.525
(3.29)* (3.26)* (3.02)* (3.24)* (3.17)* (4.50)**
BANK a11 0.255
(5.74)**
CR_RIGHT a12 0.272
(12.00)***
INVPRO a13 0.066
(0.27)
DISCL a14 0.017
(6.06)***
LGDP a15 0.033
(0.05)
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 9.76% 9.80% 9.76% 9.81% 9.82% 6.25%
N 2987 2987 2987 2987 2987 2987
Likelihood ratio 201.70*** 202.44*** 201.62*** 202.64*** 202.86*** 127.51***
Panel B: Large LLP test
Intercept a0 4.747 1.666 0.070 1.206 18.976 1.733
(30.10)*** (8.69)*** (0.00) (0.03) (2.16) (1.18)
IND a1 0.016 0.003 0.006
(1.01) (1.60) (0.98)
[6.54%] [1.22%] [2.45%]
UA a2 0.017 0.010 0.031
(22.57)*** (9.21)*** (16.72)***
[5.35%] [3.15%] [9.76%]
PD a3 0.073 0.017 0.019
(7.72)*** (11.57)*** (9.83)***
[16.64%] [3.87%] [4.33%]
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Table 8 Continued
Variable Coeff. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
MAS a4 0.008 0.002 0.002
(0.81) (2.09) (0.17)
[2.81%] [0.70%] [0.70%]
SIZE a5 0.179 0.137 0.183 0.180 0.180 0.128
(42.28)*** (27.96)*** (44.07)*** (42.36)*** (42.70)*** (25.98)***
GROWTH a6 0.669 0.996 0.658 0.669 0.663 0.677
(13.16)*** (8.88)*** (13.01)*** (13.15)*** (12.95)*** (15.50)***
LOANS a7 0.938 1.366 0.921 0.939 0.930 0.963
(11.60)*** (21.98)*** (11.42)*** (11.59)*** (11.41)*** (14.27)***
LEV a8 0.012 0.029 0.071 0.035 0.023 0.163
(0.00) (0.24) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07)
DCF a9 2.879 3.887 2.798 2.900 2.791 4.287
(1.04) (1.38) (0.98) (1.05) (0.99) (2.07)
ALLOW a10 9.330 4.267 9.467 9.386 9.247 8.205
(10.15)*** (2.15) (10.39)*** (10.19)*** (10.04)*** (5.73)**
BANK a11 0.879
(30.86)***
CR_RIGHT a12 0.180
(4.77)**
INVPRO a13 0.730
(24.31)***
DISCL a14 0.026
(9.06)***
LGDP a15 0.597
(8.35)***
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 17.43% 14.03% 17.25% 17.42% 17.45% 12.06%
N 2766 2766 2766 2766 2766 2766
Likelihood ratio 324.69*** 258.22*** 321.03*** 324.35*** 325.02*** 220.40***
Panel C: Large loss or large LLP test
Intercept a0 0.581 1.078 5.369 11.097 0.879 0.855
(0.12) (1.31) (2.55) (4.42)** (0.01)** (0.39)
IND a1 0.030 0.010 0.019
(4.74)** (3.22)* (12.27)***
[16.52%] [5.51%] [10.46%]
UA a2 0.057 0.021 0.071
(10.59)*** (10.35)*** (6.54)***
[24.34%] [8.97%] [30.31%]
PD a3 0.106 0.032 0.030
(5.03)** (5.64)** (4.44)**
[32.59%] [9.84%] [9.22%]
MAS a4 0.011 0.019 0.008
(2.86)* (0.57) (1.73)
[5.26%] [9.09%] [3.83%]
SIZE a5 0.168 0.176 0.178 0.168 0.164 0.162
(47.55)*** (56.44)*** (57.96)*** (51.04)*** (47.25)*** (54.15)***
GROWTH a6 0.267 0.268 0.256 0.255 0.196 0.192
(4.25)** (4.22)** (3.89)** (3.87)** (2.66) (2.85)*
LOANS a7 0.338 0.335 0.318 0.316 0.219 0.224
(2.97)* (2.88)* (2.63) (2.60) (1.44) (1.68)
LEV a8 1.583 1.791 1.641 1.644 2.245 1.712
(7.49)*** (9.80)*** (7.97)*** (8.13)*** (8.82)*** (8.67)***
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on the level of investor protection. Han et al. (2010)
report that, for their sample of industrial firms,
earnings management varies across high and low
levels of investor protection. Although our context
is slightly different (in a regulated industry such
as banking, bank monitoring intensity may be
equally as important as the level of investor
protection), we examine whether our sample of
international banks exhibits similar behavior. We
define a categorical variable for investor protection
(DIP), which equals 1 if INVPRO is greater than its
median value, and 0 otherwise. For the earnings
benchmark test, we include DIP and the interaction
terms DIP  IND, DIP UA, DIP PD, and DIP MAS in
Eq. (1a). Untabulated results indicate that the effect
of national culture on benchmark-beating behavior
is conditional on investor protection. Specifically,
the coefficients on DIP MAS and DIP UA are posi-
tive and significant at the 1% level. We also find
that the coefficients on DIP  IND and DIP PD are
negative and significant at the 1% level.
Fifth, we assess whether our results vary between
developed and developing countries. We use the
DEV index as reported in Table 1 of Hail and Leuz
(2006) to identify developed and developing
countries.19 We estimate our models separately
for developed and developing countries. For the
just-meet-or-beat test, only MAS is positive and
significant for the developed countries, whereas
all four culture variables are significant in the
predicted directions for the developing countries.
For the smoothing test, only UA EBTP is negative
and significant for the developed countries,
whereas for the developing countries IND EBTP
and PD EBTP are positive and significant, and
UA EBTP is negative and significant. Overall, our
untabulated results indicate that the effect
of culture is more pronounced for developing
countries.
Sixth, we test whether our results for the just-
meet-or-beat test hold for the subset of firms used
in the income-smoothing test. Our untabulated
results indicate that PD, UA, and MAS are signifi-
cant in the predicted direction. Only IND loses its
significance.
Estimating bank-level regressions in a pooled
sample can bias the coefficients, because our
culture variables are measured at the country level.
Table 8 Continued
Variable Coeff. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
DCF a9 1.249 1.184 1.112 1.253 1.155 1.954
(0.19) (0.19) (0.16) (0.20) (0.00) (0.48)
ALLOW a10 8.623 9.210 9.004 9.171 9.884 9.269
(5.78)** (6.52)*** (5.86)** (6.43)** (7.32)*** (5.98)**
BANK a11 0.640
(27.07)***
CR_RIGHT a12 0.262
(10.24)***
INVPRO a13 0.408
(9.66)***
DISCL a14 0.028
(12.46)***
LGDP a15 0.072
(0.19)
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 17.43% 17.38% 17.55% 17.53% 17.52% 13.30%
N 2656 2656 2656 2656 2656 2656
Likelihood ratio 364.52*** 353.47*** 357.20*** 356.80*** 356.53*** 266.12***
This table provides preliminary evidence on whether cultural factors help to explain financial difficulties experienced by banks during the crisis period.
Earnings quality is measured in two ways: the probability of a bank having a large loss or a large LLP. A bank is considered as incurring large loss when its
ROA is less than 5%, and large LLP when its LLP is more than 1% of total loans. All the independent variables are measured at year 2006, and the
dependent variable (large loss, large LLP, either large loss or large LLP) is measured at year 2007 or 2008. Troubled banks with either large loss or large
LLP in year 2006 were deleted from the sample. We report results for large loss, large LLP, and either large loss or large LLP test in Panels A, B and C
respectively.
Definitions of the other variables are provided in Table 1. For each variable, we report the regression coefficient, followed by the Wald statistic in
parentheses. For the main variable of interest (culture variable), we also report the marginal effect (in percent) in the square brackets.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Therefore, in our final sensitivity test, we conduct
our analysis based on country-year level data (Hail
& Leuz, 2006). We measure the bank-level controls
at their country-year means. There are 450 and 273
country-years for the just-meet-or-beat test and
smoothing test, respectively. The power of the
test is reduced, because of the smaller number of
observations. Despite this, in the just-meet-or-beat
test we still find the coefficients on MAS and UA
to be significant and have signs consistent with the
main results. In the income-smoothing test the
interactions between IND, UA, PD, and EBTP are
significant and have signs consistent with the main
results. Overall, these results are largely consistent
with the bank-level pooled regressions.
CONCLUSIONS
The primary research question addressed in this
study is whether and how various dimensions of
national culture influence the earnings quality
of banks. Given the importance of banking to
national and global economies, and the importance
of differences in national culture to managerial
behavior, it is surprising that there is no prior
evidence on the implications of national culture for
bank earnings quality.
We conduct our main analyses using a sample of
banks from 39 countries over the period 1993–2006.
We examine the relation between four dimensions
of national culture and two earnings management
proxies for bank earnings quality during the pre-
financial crisis period. We find that banks in high
individualism, high masculinity, and low uncer-
tainty avoidance societies tend to manage earnings
to just-meet-or-beat the prior year’s earnings. In
tests of income smoothing through loan loss
provisions, we find that banks in high indivi-
dualism, high power distance, and low uncertainty
avoidance societies tend to report smoother earn-
ings. Our results imply that culture has an impor-
tant effect on bank earnings quality, despite the
banking industry being highly regulated.
Our exploratory analysis of the effects of national
culture on accounting outcomes during the crisis
period (i.e., the period 2007–2008) provides inter-
esting insights into the risk-taking behavior of
banks. We find that banks in cultures that encou-
rage higher risk-taking experienced more trouble in
the form of larger losses or larger LLPs.
Our study is subject to the following limitations.
First, Hofstede’s cultural variables are measured at
the country level, whereas our tests are based
primarily on bank-level analysis. Although we
examine the sensitivity of our results by replac-
ing the bank-year data with country-year data, we
still assume that the Hofstede measures are con-
stant over time. Second, some of Hofstede’s mea-
sures are significantly correlated with each other.
In particular, individualism is highly correlated
with power distance and uncertainty avoidance.
Although we test for the effects of multicollinearity
on our inferences, we note that caution should be
exercised in interpreting our regression results,
especially when all four cultural dimensions are
included in the same regression. Third, we note
that the reported relations between national
culture and earnings quality are observed associa-
tions, and may not result from underlying causal
relations.
Our results also imply that the bank earnings
quality in the pre-crisis period and the bank
accounting outcomes during the crisis period are
driven by risk-taking behavior of banks. Future
research can explore the effects of national culture
on bank risk-taking. Additionally, future research
can expand on the early evidence we provide on
the effects of national culture on bank accounting
outcomes during the crisis period. A comprehen-
sive crisis-period analysis could incorporate differ-
ences in international institutional factors such
as legal, extra-legal, and political variables, in addi-
tion to cultural dimensions. Another potential
avenue for future research is studying the effects
of national culture on information asymmetry
between different stakeholders in the banking
industry. The higher level of information asymme-
try resulting from the complexity of the banking
industry makes it a powerful setting for examining
the relation between national culture and informa-
tion asymmetry.
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NOTES
1There are several other advantages of focusing on
the banking industry. In particular, our study mitigates
error in measuring managerial discretion by focusing
on a single accrual in a single industry. Focusing on a
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single accrual facilitates a sharper separation into its
normal (nondiscretionary) and abnormal (discretion-
ary) components. We use a number of industry-
specific variables to better isolate the normal loan loss
provisions (LLP) from the abnormal LLP. Also, focusing
on a single, relatively homogeneous industry provides
control over other determinants of cross-sectional
differences in accruals, thus increasing the reliability
of the inferences from our empirical analysis.
2In our tests, we control for country fixed effects,
bank-specific monitoring variables, and country-
specific institutional variables whose influence on
earnings management has been documented in the
prior literature (e.g., Fonseca & Gonzalez, 2008; Han
et al., 2010; Leuz et al., 2003).
3Gray (1988) identifies the mapping between the
four societal values identified by Hofstede (1980) and
the following four selected accounting values: profes-
sionalism vs statutory control, uniformity vs flexibility,
conservatism vs optimism, and secrecy vs transparency.
4Please see Han et al. (2010: 125–126) for a more
complete discussion of how Gray’s (1988) predictions
relate to expectations on earnings management.
5Regulations mirroring the Sarbanes–Oxley Act have
been introduced in several other countries including
Australia, Canada, Singapore, and the UK, to name
a few.
6A recent survey of managers by Graham, Harvey,
and Rajgopal (2005) finds that meeting or beating the
prior period’s earnings is one of the most important
benchmarks for corporate managers.
7The correlations for some variables are very high. For
example, the correlation between INVPRO and LGDP
is 0.91. This high correlation may induce a multi-
collinearity problem in our analysis. However, this
problem is mitigated because we also use country-level
controls for the country-wide fixed effects. Our results
yield similar inferences when we use controls for country
fixed effects or country-level institutional variables,
further strengthening the reliability of our tests.
8We note that IND is highly correlated with PD
(r¼0.648) and with UAI (r¼0.299). Given these
high levels of correlation among the independent
variables of interest, we also estimate models (1a)
and (1b) separately for each individual dimension
of culture. In addition, we examine the variance
inflation factors (VIFs) to check for multicollinearity in
the full regressions that include all four cultural
dimensions. We find that the VIFs are low, indicating
that multicollinearity is not a major issue in these
regressions.
9We also use the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov,
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) and an
indicator variable for legal origin (common vs code law)
as alternative proxies for investor protection. The results
are similar.
10These variables have also been used in seve-
ral prior studies (e.g., Kanagaretnam et al., 2004;
Kanagaretnam, Krishnan, & Lobo, 2010a; Wahlen,
1994) to estimate the normal component of LLP.
11The inclusion of EBTP and its interaction with
various cultural factors may introduce multicollinearity
among the interaction terms. We mean-center the
culture variables to mitigate this concern (Aiken &
West, 1991; Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1989).
12It is generally accepted that the recent financial
crisis in the US and UK started in 2007 (Ryan, 2008).
However, the financial crisis spread to other countries
in 2008 (Laeven & Valencia, 2010).
13A total of 39 countries are available for the just-
meet-or-beat test and 35 countries for the smoothing
test. Some countries (e.g., Malaysia) have data for the
just-meet-or-beat test but not for the smoothing test,
because of missing information on capital ratio, non-
performing loans, etc.
14We delete the top and bottom 1% of each of the
continuous control variables used in regression models
(1) and (2) to remove extreme values. The results are
robust if we winsorize (rather than delete) the extreme
values. The majority of the banks in our sample (over
64% for the just-meet-or-beat test and over 76% for
smoothing test) are commercial banks. The results are
similar when we run our tests for the subsample of
commercial banks.
15The coverage in BankScope is more complete
from year 2000 and later. Our results are robust to
excluding years 1993–1999.
16The marginal effect per standard deviation (SD)
change for a cultural variable is computed as
p (1p) b SD, where p is the base rate (0.11)
and b is the estimated coefficient from the logistic
regression (Liao, 1994).
17This line of reasoning is consistent with the prior
literature. For example, Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003),
Watts (2003), and Ball and Shivakumar (2005)
argue that timely reporting of economic losses facil-
itates monitoring of managerial and debt contracts,
increases the economic efficiency of firms’ contracting
with both managers and debt holders, and improves
investment efficiency and profitability. Ahmed and
Duellman (2007) examine a sample of US firms and
show that firms with more conservative earnings
have higher future profitability and lower likelihood
(and magnitude) of future special items charges.
18We note that our inferences are similar when we
use Eqs. (1b) and (2b).
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19Specifically, a country is considered to be deve-
loping if its equity market is not included in the Morgan
Stanley Capital International database. Based on this
definition, the following 19 economies are considered
as developed: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore,
Spain, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.
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